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Fallacy

The Penguin® English Dictionary - Penguin.
1. a false idea:
the popular fallacy that scientists are illiterate.
2. in logic, an argument
failing to satisfy the conditions of valid inference.[Latin fallacia, from
fallac-, fallax deceitful, from fallere to deceive].

Fallacy

The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Houghton Mifflin
Company®.
A false or mistaken idea based on faulty knowledge or reasoning.
For example, kings who have divorced their wives for failing to produce a son
have held to the fallacy that a mother determines the sex of a child, when
actually the father does. (See sex chromosomes).

Fallacy

Chambers 21st Century Dictionary - Chambers Harrap Publishers

noun (fallacies) 1. a mistaken notion.
2. a mistake in reasoning that
spoils a whole argument. See also logic, syllogism. [from Latin fallax
deceptive.]

Fallacy

Roget's II: The New Thesaurus - Houghton Mifflin Company®

noun 1. An erroneous or false idea: erroneousness, error, falsehood,
falseness, falsity, untruth.
2. Plausible but invalid reasoning: casuistry,
sophism, sophistry, speciousness, spuriousness.See correct, true.

Fallacy

A Dictionary of Philosophy, Macmillan® - Macmillan Publishers

An argument involving an invalid, rather than a valid, form of reasoning. For
example, it would be fallacious to argue: given that 'All Communists claim to
repudiate racial discrimination', and given that 'Dr. Smith claims to repudiate
racial discrimination', then it must follow that 'Dr. Smith is a Communist'.
For, although the conclusion may be true, it cannot validly be deduced from
those premises. The argument is thus one token of the type traditionally
labelled the fallacy of the undistributed middle. The word 'fallacy' is often
used loosely in general language to characterize any supposed error, and a clear
distinction must be made between this general usage and the strictly logical
usage in which its function is to distinguish one particular kind of
error.

Fallacy

Crystal Reference® Encyclopedia - Crystal Reference

In logic, an invalid inference. ‘All cats are mammals, Fido is a mammal;
therefore Fido is a cat’ is a fallacy, easily confused with the valid ‘All cats
are mammals, Fido is a cat; therefore Fido is a mammal’. An argument can of
course be valid but have a false conclusion, or be invalid and have a true one.
In everyday speech the word fallacy is used much more generally to denote a
mistake or error. See deduction, induction (logic), inference.

Fallacy

Collins English Dictionary - HarperCollins

noun plural -cies 1. an incorrect or misleading notion or opinion based on
inaccurate facts or invalid reasoning.
2. unsound or invalid
reasoning.
3. the tendency to mislead.
4. Logic an error in reasoning that
renders an argument logically invalid. [from Latin fallcia, from fallax
deceitful, from fallere to deceive].

Fallacy

The Penguin Dictionary of Psychology - Penguin

An argument involving logically invalid or improper reasoning and, by
extension, a conclusion reached by such fallacious reasoning. Note that the
meaning of the term depends on the reasoning and not on what is reasoned.
Although fallacies usually lead to false conclusions they do not do so by
definition; it is quite possible to reach a valid conclusion by faulty
means.

Fallacy

The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language -
Houghton Mifflin Company

n. pl. fallacies.
1. A false notion.
2. A statement or an argument
based on a false or invalid inference.
3. Incorrectness of reasoning or
belief; erroneousness.
4. The quality of being deceptive.
[Alteration of
Middle English fallace, from Old French, from Latin fallcia, deceit, from fallx,
fallc-, deceitful, from fallere, to deceive.]

Fallacy

The Companion to British History, Routledge

Aristotle classified fallacies as
1. material, or misstatements of
facts:
2. verbal or misuse of words:
3. formal or contrary to logic:
or
4. accidental or proceeding from the general to the particular. This
system made its way into Christian thought.

J.S. Mill classified them into fallacies
1. of simple inspection including
prejudices;
2. of observation;
3. of generalisation;
4. of
ratiocination or induction;
5. Of confusion including ambiguity.

Close inspection suggests that the two philosophers were farther apart in
time than substance.

Fallacy

The Columbia Encyclopedia - Columbia University Press

In logic, a term used to characterize an invalid argument. Strictly speaking,
it refers only to the transition from a set of premises to a conclusion, and is
distinguished from falsity, a value attributed to a single statement. The laws
of syllogisms were systematically elaborated by Aristotle, and for an argument
to be valid, it must adhere to all the laws; to be fallacious, it need only
break one (see syllogism). The term fallacy has come to be used in a somewhat
wider sense than the purely formal one. Informal fallacies are said to occur
when statements are ambiguous or vague as to the logical form they represent, or
when a multiplicity of meaning is present and the validity of the argument
depends on switching meanings of a word or a phrase in midstream.

Fallacy

Encyclopædia Britannica Article

In logic, erroneous reasoning that has the appearance of soundness. Among
numerous types of logical fallacies that have been noted, some of the better
known are: post hoc ergo propter hoc (“after this, therefore,
because of this”), in which something is assumed to be the cause of something
else merely because it was antecedent in time; ad hominem (“against the man”),
attacking an individual rather than establishing pertinent facts; and circulus
in probando (“arguing in a circle”; also called petitio principii, “begging the
question”), attempting to demonstrate a conclusion by means of premises that
presuppose that conclusion.

Informal fallacy

The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy - Cambridge
University Press

An error of reasoning or tactic of argument that can be used to persuade
someone with whom you are reasoning that your argument is correct when really it
is not. The standard treatment of the informal fallacies in logic textbooks
draws heavily on Aristotle’s list, but there are many variants, and new
fallacies have often been added, some of which have gained strong footholds in
the textbooks. The word ‘informal’ indicates that these fallacies are not simply
localized faults or failures in the given propositions (premises and conclusion)
of an argument to conform to a standard of semantic correctness (like that of
deductive logic), but are misuses of the argument in relation to a context of
reasoning or type of dialogue that an arguer is supposed to be engaged in.
Informal logic is the subfield of logical inquiry that deals with these
fallacies. Typically, informal fallacies have a pragmatic (practical) aspect
relating to how an argument is being used, and also a dialectical aspect,
pertaining to a context of dialogue-normally an exchange between two
participants in a discussion. Both aspects are major concerns of informal
logic.

Fallacy

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Fal•la•cious

WEBSTER'S II New Riverside University Dictionary

(fæ-lã'shæs) adj. 1. Containing fundamental errors
in reasoning 2. Misleadning: deceptive.
-fal•la´cious•ly
*syns: FALLACIOUS, FALSE,
ILLOGICAL, INVALID, SOPHISTIC, SPECIOUS, SPURIOUS adj. core meaning :
containing fundamental errors in reasoning <a fallacious
argument> <fallacious logic>

Fal•la•cy

WEBSTER'S II New Riverside University Dictionary

(fæl'ã-se) n., pl.-cies. [Lat. fallacia,
deceit < falax, deceitful < fallere, to deceive.]
1. A false notion. 2. A statement or argument
based on a false or invalid inference. 3. Incorrectness of
reasoning or belief. 4. The quality of being deceptive.

Fallacy

1911-utgaven av Encyclopedia Britanica

((Lat. fall-ax, apt to mislead) the term given generally to any
mistaken statement used in argument; in Logic, technically, an argument which
violates the laws of correct demonstration.

Baldwin 1901

Fra DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY - av James Mark Baldwin
(1901)



Fallacy
[Lat. fallere, to deceive]: Ger. Beweis-Fehler,
Schluss-Fehler, Fallacie; Fr. sophisme; Ital.
sofisma. Fallacy is any violation of the conditions of proof, any failure
to conform to the laws of valid reasoning.

As each condition of proof may be violated, the only complete description of
fallacy would be given as an enumeration of the forms assumed by such
violations. Concrete reasoning, involving generally a complex of such
conditions, does not adapt itself readily to such detailed scrutiny; but the
attempts to classify systematically the varieties of fallacy in concrete
reasoning have not been very successful, and have generally involved a certain
confusion between two distinct principles of division:

  • (1) the nature of the circumstances inducing fallacy;
  • (2) the logical condition violated.

In the traditional treatment,
which is an inheritance from Aristotle's logic, the former principle appears
mainly in the case of so-called verbal fallacies. The discussion of fallacy
having mainly a practical end, a classification which assigns a place to the
more common and important types of fallacy is the most useful. The main groups
in such a classification seem to be: --

  1. (1) Formal Fallacies, violations of conditions which are stated in
    terms of non-significant symbols -- such, e.g., are the errors which arise from
    misinterpretation of the relation between a positive and a negative proposition,
    especially when the terms are complex, or confusion between contraries and
    contradictories; violation of the rules of conversion and contraposition;
    violation of the syllogistic rules, the most important being
    undistributed middle and illicit process; violation of the
    rules of hypothetical syllogism, of which Aristotle's fallacy of the
    consequent
    is the best known.

  2. (2) Verbal Fallacies, those which depend on, or involve a double
    interpretation of, the parts of the reasoning, and which are possible by reason
    of the ambiguity of words or verbal expressions. Under this class come
    Aristotle's fallacies in dictione, though it has to be noted that what he
    called composition and division are really verbal or grammatical fallacies, and
    do not correspond to what modern logicians include under that term.

  3. (3) Real Fallacies, those which arise from a confused conception
    either of the contents of the evidence put forward, or of the relation between
    that evidence and the conclusion taken to be proved by it, or of the bearing of
    the conclusion reached on some thesis or issue contemplated. Such confusion of
    thought may conveniently be further specified as in deductive or in inductive
    reasoning. Of the deductive, the main types are:

    • (a) what may be called composition and division, for
      the error involved is a confusion of thought regarding the different relations
      of whole and part, of which the numerical is only one, though perhaps the most
      important;
    • (b) what may bear the Aristotelian title fallacies of
      accident
      , resting on confusion of thought regarding the true relation of
      absolute and relative, abstract and concrete, general and specific or
      individual, unqualified and qualified, whether in terms or assertions;
    • (c) petitio principii, begging the question; assuming as
      ground of proof what is in fact the probandum, or what can only be proved
      jointly with the probandum. Circulus in probando or in
      demonstrando
      , argument in a circle, a form of this fallacy, is generally
      characterized and facilitated by the interpolation of several intermediate steps
      between the identical assertions. Hysteron proteron (usteron proteron) is a name for one variety of such a circle.
      To this head may also be referred that frequent source of fallacy in indirect
      reasoning on concrete matters -- incomplete disjunction, or inadequate
      enumeration of alternative possibilities.
  4. (4)Ignoratio elenchi, irrelevant reasoning, where the argument,
    sound, it may be, in itself, is supposed to establish a conclusion which is not
    that drawn from the premises used. Of this a number of special forms have
    received special names: argumentum ad hominem, ad populum, ad
    verecundiam
    , ad baculum, involving identification of the truth of a
    thesis with the character or consistency of its supporter, with its conformity
    to popular prejudice, with the moral elevation and purity of purpose of its
    advocates, or with the power of overcoming its antagonists by physical force.
    More subtle forms are those of shifting ground, objections,
    partial refutation, proving too little or too much.

    Inductive fallacies, being violations of the conditions of inductive proof,
    can best be arranged as attaching to the several steps whereby a universal
    relating to concrete fact is formed, applied in explanation, and tested. Such
    fallacies have a considerable resemblance to those of deductive reasoning. There
    are few current technical designations of them. The most important varieties
    are: neglect of negative instances (including all types of
    non-observation): undue simplification, depending on neglect of points of
    difference and on intrusion of the subjective into the objective, and involving
    as cases oversight of plurality of causes and of the multiformity or complexity
    of both causes and effects; post hoc ergo propter hoc, the substitution
    of coexistence or mere temporal sequence for cause and effect; insufficient
    enumeration
    of conditions operative, of successive stages in a process, or
    of alternative possibilities of explanation; insufficient verification;
    false analogy.

Literature:

    The epoch-making treatments of fallacy have been:

  • (1) that of ARISTOTLE, in the Sophistici Elenchi (cf. ed. by E. Poste, with
    full notes and translation, 1866);
  • (2) BACON'S survey of the Idola, in Nov. Org., Bk. I;
  • (3) WHATELY'S, in Bk. III of his Logic;
  • (4) MILL'S in Bk. V of his Logic.
  • The Aristotelian doctrine is well stated and illustrated in DE MORGAN,
    Formal Logic (1847), and in N. K. DAVIS, Theory of Thought (1880).
  • An excellent treatment of the whole subject from the practical view of
    logic, as a preservative against error, is given in A. SIDGWICK, Fallacies
    (1883).
  • A very elaborate classification and helpful treatment is in WELTON, Manual
    of Logic, ii (1896).
  • There are also excellent remarks, though confined to fallacy in one special
    field, in BENTHAM, Book of Fallacies (1824).